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Local growth ambitions 
A B S T R A C T   
It is generally assumed that municipalities attract residents and businesses as a result of intermunicipal 
competition for tax revenues. This growth-oriented behaviour poses a serious problem considering interna-
tionally acknowledged goals to limit land take. Nonetheless, research on how fiscal incentives affect municipal 
land policies is scarce. Adapting a neoinstitutionalist approach, we compare the two contrasting fiscal systems of 
Germany and the Netherlands. While clear incentives can be deducted from the different sources of municipal 
income, complex balancing measurements and consequential infrastructure investments make it difficult to 
predict a project’s profitability. According to the perspective of planning practitioners in municipalities around 
the growth centres of Utrecht and Berlin interviewed for this study, local pressures force them to keep allocating 
new building sites. In order to create effective policies to limit land take, it is important to understand not only 
the influence of fiscal incentives but also of place-specific pressures on municipal land policies.   
1. Introduction 
Land is a scarce resource. Its preservation is important for biodi-
versity, landscape preservation, food security, water management and 
carbon sequestration (European Commission, 2012). Therefore, gov-
ernments in Europe and worldwide highly prioritize limiting land take, 
defined as “the change in the area of agricultural, forest and other 
semi-natural land taken for urban and other artificial land development” 
(European Environment Agency EEA, 2019). In its Roadmap to a 
Resource Efficient Europe, the European Commission (2011) sets the goal 
of fully preventing net land loss by 2050 in order to stop the contami-
nation and irreversible erosion of fertile soils. Many national govern-
ments have adopted this goal. 
Simultaneously, governments on the local level often adopt a 
growth-oriented behaviour, which here is understood as an ambition to 
increase the amount of residential and industrial areas within a mu-
nicipality (Wegener, 2016; Langer and Korzhenevych, 2018; 
Hartoft-Nielsen, 2018; Monstadt and Meilinger, 2020; Shao et al., 2020). 
This is problematic as local governments in many countries have the 
responsibility to translate national goals into legally binding land use 
plans. 
While scholars and practitioners alike search for ways to overcome 
this “municipal egoism” (Christoffersen, 2019, p. 16), for example 
through better communication and participation processes (van Zoest, 
2010; Colombo et al., 2018; Fertner et al., 2016), through a transfer of 
power to higher levels of government (Wegener, 2016), or through 
equalization of development profits (see Henger and Bizer (2010) for 
Tradable Development Rights), the question remains relevant: why does 
it seem to be so important for a municipality to grow? 
Scholars generally assume that municipalities allocate new building 
sites to attract inhabitants and firms (Duranton and Puga, 2013) because 
inhabitants and firms come with tax revenues. As municipalities are 
interested in increasing their tax incomes, they compete with each other 
for growth (Monstadt and Meilinger, 2020; Colsaet et al., 2018; Henger 
and Bizer, 2010; Langer and Korzhenevych, 2018). 
This puts the fiscal system at the root of the problem. The fiscal 
system determines how municipalities generate revenues and makes 
some forms of land use more profitable than others. One can therefore 
assume that different fiscal systems incentivise different land use pol-
icies. Kaufmann (2018a) therefore recognizes local tax autonomy as a 
“game changer for locational policies agendas” (Kaufmann, 2018a, p. 
22). He further underlines that this effect gains force with a more 
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decentralized fiscal system, meaning a system where municipalities are 
more dependent on their own tax revenues. Higher tier governments 
have to take incentives from the fiscal system into consideration in order 
to effectively prevent land take (OECD, 2017). 
Despite its relevance, studies on the relation between land policies 
and fiscal systems are rare. This contribution aims at revealing how 
different fiscal systems affect land policy goals of local governments. 
Which forms of land use are incentivised by different fiscal systems? 
Apart from generating revenues, what other reasons do municipalities 
have to grow? And what is the role of fiscal incentives compared to other 
influences on municipal land policies? 
Following a neoinstitutional approach, we not only use formal 
institutional rules to explain differences in land policies but also 
consider the effect of local arrangements and other place-specific cir-
cumstances (Debrunner and Hartmann, 2020; Kaufmann and Arnold, 
2017). Therefore, a qualitative approach was chosen to gain in-depth 
insights into the motivations behind the land policies of selected 
municipalities. 
2. Formal and informal institutional rules in policymaking 
In this paper we are interested in what influences municipal land 
policies. Land policies are all political and legal measures that a mu-
nicipality applies to regulate land use according to a politically defined 
goal (Hartmann and Spit, 2015). Following neoinstitutionalist theory, 
land policies, just as any other human actions, are guided by formal and 
informal rules (North, 1990). These rules constrain actor groups’ scope 
of action and guide what individuals expect others to do (Scharpf, 1997; 
Hall and Taylor, 1996). Within public policy analysis, formal institu-
tional rules are found in the democratic, constitutional framework 
(Knoepfel et al., 2007). They influence public policies as they determine 
which actors are involved in decision-making processes and what re-
sources these actors can mobilize to enforce their interests. On the other 
hand, public policies are also shaped by the actors’ own political and 
strategic interest (Gerber et al., 2018, p. xii). For example, Debrunner 
and Hartmann (2020) show how the application of policy instruments 
varies between Swiss municipalities, depending on local actors’ 
arrangements. 
In order to analyse influences on municipal land policies, we will 
therefore characterize and compare this interplay of institutional rules 
and local arrangements in two case study areas. We will do so using a 
framework from Multilevel Governance (MLG) analysis, which ad-
dresses that various levels of government develop policies simulta-
neously (Hooghe and Marks, 2003). Applied to urban politics, this 
implies that municipal policies are a result of interactions between ac-
tors at different scales (Kaufmann and Sidney, 2020). One can distin-
guish two main dimensions that describe the framework in which public 
policies emerge: a vertical and a horizontal dimension (Horak and 
Young, 2012). While municipalities are nested in a structured hierarchy 
of higher tier constraints and opportunities, the horizontal dimension 
accounts for their nesting in a wider metropolitan context and includes 
interactions with nongovernmental actors (Kübler and Pagano, 2012). 
Kaufmann (2018a) applies this framework to explain policy goals of 
secondary capital cities. On the vertical axis, he places features such as 
the degree of fiscal and political autonomy. On the horizontal axis, he 
places local actors’ arrangements. 
A high degree of fiscal autonomy is achieved in a decentralised fiscal 
system where local governments collect and keep local taxes. On the 
other hand, in a centralised fiscal system, tax revenues are collected and 
redistributed by the central government. Local governments, then, 
depend on national grants and are less autonomous. Generally speaking, 
fiscally autonomous local governments are expected to be more 
competitive and growth-oriented than local governments that depend 
on state grants (Kaufmann and Sager, 2018). Municipalities in central-
ised fiscal systems, on the other hand, have stronger incentives to pursue 
urban containment policies (OECD, 2017, p. 92). According to 
Kaufmann (2018b), the “degree of local tax autonomy is the best pre-
dictor of locational policies as it sets up the structures under which cities 
can raise funds” (p. 12). When analysing municipal land policies within 
different fiscal systems, one can also take into account local govern-
ments’ political autonomy, which is determined by constraints from 
higher-level governments (Goldsmith, 1995). While a high degree of 
fiscal autonomy incentivizes competitive behaviour among municipal-
ities in France, local spatial plans have to conform with development 
plans on a regional level (OECD, 2017). 
On the horizontal axis, local business actors such as landowners, 
investors and developers can orient land policies towards more growth 
(Kaufmann, 2018a). By contrast, citizens can block further de-
velopments as they experience negative consequences of growth 
(Monstadt and Meilinger, 2020). Thus, strong influences at the local 
dimension can enable local governments to resist incentives from the 
vertical axis (e.g., incentives to grow) (OECD, 2017). 
In the remaining paper we will use this analytical framework to 
describe influences on local land policies in two case study areas. For the 
case study analysis, we have chosen two countries with contrasting fiscal 
systems in order to highlight the distinctiveness of different national 
practices. While municipalities in Germany have a high degree of fiscal 
autonomy and a monopoly on local tax revenues, municipalities in the 
Netherlands depend on rate support grants from the national govern-
ment. Additionally, it is common for Dutch municipalities to actively 
develop land. On the other hand, German municipalities predominantly 
pursue passive land policies. The national governments of both countries 
see the prevention of land take as crucial for their future spatial devel-
opment (Die Bundesregierung, 2018; Ministerie van Binnenlandse 
Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2019). In both Germany and the 
Netherlands, municipalities are responsible for creating legally binding 
land use plans. Their urban growth is regulated by higher tier govern-
ments (states and provinces, respectively). Within these two countries, 
we have chosen to focus our research on the municipalities surrounding 
the cities of Berlin and Utrecht. Though the metropolitan region of 
Berlin-Brandenburg counts about 5 times as many inhabitants as the 
region of Utrecht, the cases are comparable in the sense that they are 
both important growth centres within their national context. Addition-
ally, the relationship between strongly growing core municipalities on 
the one side and surrounding municipalities that are more reluctant in 
terms of further urban growth on the other side is similar in both 
regions. 
In the following, we will describe the Dutch and German fiscal sys-
tem, based on an analysis of secondary literature, legislation, handbooks 
on municipal finance, city budgets and secondary statistical data. The 
focus lies on sources of municipal income that can be influenced by their 
land policies. Beyond that, municipal expenditures were included as 
they can eat up the profits of certain developments. 
This research is complemented by 11 semi-structured interviews that 
were conducted in the summer of 2020 with governmental representa-
tives of various levels of government in both case areas (see Table A1 in 
the appendix for an anonymized list of interviewees). These interviews 
were dedicated to both understanding the land policy goals that mu-
nicipalities were pursuing as well as the role that fiscal incentives play in 
the preparation of land policies next to other influencing factors. The 
interviews were transcribed, coded, and triangulated with the above- 
mentioned document analysis. 
3. The fiscal system of Germany and the Netherlands compared 
We will illustrate the distribution of incomes and expenditures based 
on average budgets of German and Dutch municipalities respectively. In 
general, these are comparable to the budgets of the municipalities in the 
observed regions. In a national comparison, municipalities surrounding 
Utrecht and Berlin are fiscally stable, considering a relatively low 
indebtedness, and – regarding the German municipalities – high tax 
incomes (BDO, 2020; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2019). 
V. Götze and T. Hartmann                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Land Use Policy 109 (2021) 105681
3
3.1. Germany 
German municipalities retrieve the largest part of their income from 
local taxes (Fig. 1). The three most important taxes are the business tax 
(44%), the income tax (37%) and the property tax (14%). On average, 
state rate support grants only constitute a third of the municipal budget 
(Scherf, 2010). Fees cover charges for waste (water) disposal and other 
services. In contrast to tax revenues, municipalities can only charge the 
exact amount that is needed to provide the respective service, or, in 
other words, they are earmarked and were therefore excluded from the 
analysis. Other revenues consist of (1) license fees paid by network 
operators for the right to use municipal streets and infrastructure as well 
as (2) revenues from economic activity. As they cannot be influenced by 
municipal land policies, they will not be regarded further. 
Table 1 illustrates the different sources of income and expenditures. 
3.2. The Netherlands 
About two thirds of the budget of an average Dutch municipality is 
derived from national grants (see Fig. 2). The national allocations can be 
divided into the unconditional grant and specific grants. The uncondi-
tional grant covers around 55% of the municipal budget and the specific 
grants cover an additional 10% of the municipal budget (CBS, 2020). 
While the specific grants are earmarked, the municipality can spend 
their unconditional grant freely (see Table 2). 
3.3. Incentivised forms of land use in Germany and the Netherlands 
The different fiscal systems provide various incentives for munici-
palities in Germany and the Netherlands. 
3.3.1. Germany 
In the decentralized fiscal system of Germany, municipalities can 
keep revenues from local taxes. In general, this makes growth profitable. 
Although an increase in local revenues also leads to a lower alloca-
tion of state grants and higher regional contributions, the fiscal benefits 
of high revenues from local taxes are not completely outweighed. A 
municipality with high local revenues has more freedom of action than a 
municipality that is completely dependent on state grants. 
If a German municipality is interested in generating more income, it 
can target its land use to maximize revenues from business and income 
taxes. Generally, tax revenues can be increased by attracting more 
businesses and more inhabitants to the municipality. More specifically, 
businesses with a high profit and inhabitants with high incomes lead to a 
larger tax revenue increase than small businesses and inhabitants with a 
low income. 
In order to attract these target groups, the municipality can – 
amongst other things – provide the plots that these target groups de-
mand. Given the assumption that large businesses have many employees 
and need much space, the municipality can primarily allocate large 
business areas. Given the assumption that wealthy inhabitants move to 
the suburbs in search of a large, detached house surrounded by nature, 
the municipality can primarily allocate large plots surrounded by nature 
for large, detached houses. In summary, increases in business and in-
come taxes can incentivise municipalities to allocate large-scale business 
areas and large residential plots for spacious, detached houses, which 
only citizens with a high income can afford. 
However, this simple equation must be scrutinised by also taking 
consequential costs into account. As mentioned above, increased local 
revenues do not stay in the municipal budget completely. To some de-
gree, they are outweighed by lower state allocations and higher regional 
contributions. Also, consequential infrastructure investments must be 
considered: A growing population needs more kindergartens and 
schools; higher business activity puts more stress on transport 
infrastructure. 
On the one hand, targeting new developments on high-income 
households can avoid comparatively high costs of disbursing unem-
ployment and other social benefits. On the other hand, high-end, low- 
density residential developments lead to the issue that public infra-
structure investments are used by fewer people. This can lead to 
decreased cost-efficiency of technical infrastructure, for example. 
Fig. 1. Average municipal budget of a German municipality. Own figure based 
on Scherf (2010). 
Table 1 
Revenues and expenditures of German municipalities.  
Business tax Based on business profits within the municipality, multiplied with a 
collection rate, which the municipality can determine. Although 
business tax revenues can play a substantial role in the municipal 
budget, they fluctuate with economic developments (Gesellschaft für 
Innovationsforschung und Beratung mbH and Deutsches Institut für 
Urbanistik gGmbH, 2012). 
Income tax Based on the income of the municipality’s residents. Attracting 
wealthy residents promises high and steady future revenues from the 
income tax. 
Property tax Paid by owners of business and residential estate, based on the 
property value multiplied by a collection rate that can be determined 
by the municipality; consists of land value and value of the buildings. 
Grants Unconditional grants are paid by the state to fill in possible gaps 
between a municipality’s expenses and its revenues. If the tax 
revenues of a municipality are increasing, it receives less financial 
support from the state. If a municipality earns more than it spends, it 
is no longer eligible for the grant. In some states, these municipalities 
must pay surplus revenues to the state for redistribution. 
Expenditures Among the different expenditures, social costs (e.g., unemployment 
benefits) are of relevance to municipal land policies. About 12% of the 
municipal budget is left for investments (Scherf, 2010). With these, a 
municipality must finance technical and social infrastructure, such as 
streets, schools and kindergartens as well as energy and sewage 
systems.  
Fig. 2. Average municipal budget of a Dutch municipality. Own figure based 
on CBS (2020). 
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Anticipating all consequential costs of a development can be challenging 
for a municipality. 
3.3.2. Netherlands 
The fiscal system of the Netherlands is centralized, meaning that 
most tax revenues go to the state and are distributed among the mu-
nicipalities from there. Local growth is therefore expected to be rewar-
ded to a lesser degree than in the decentralized fiscal system of 
Germany. Still, as a larger population can move a municipality to 
another category of the rate support grant, which allows municipalities 
to govern more efficiently, local governments in the Netherlands do 
have a fiscal incentive to grow. 
That said, it is not easy to determine fiscal incentives that are more 
targeted towards certain developments. To move into a higher category 
of the rate support grant, it is sufficient to simply increase the popula-
tion. The municipality can try to raise its local revenues to become less 
dependent on variable national grants and gain freedom of action that 
comes with a larger municipal budget. 
To increase revenues from the local property tax, the municipality 
can choose to allocate areas for high-end residential developments or 
focus more on profitable business developments. Also, it can try to avoid 
expenses for social welfare by attracting wealthy inhabitants with little 
to no health issues and no children in the compulsory school age. But the 
tools to target such specific population groups are too coarse. Moreover, 
the national grant considers and covers social costs already. It is thus 
questionable whether these manoeuvres would really lead to a more 
profitable development. 
Municipalities have different and easier ways to generate local tax 
revenues that are not necessarily connected to their land use policy. For 
example, they can collect a tourist tax, parking fees, or offer the service 
of collecting industrial waste (Treasurer, municipality G, Utrecht). 
The largest fiscal benefits, however, can be achieved by developing 
on municipality-owned land. Although it is a one-time income, land 
exploitation is fiscally very attractive for municipalities in the 
Netherlands, especially in cases where greenfields are transformed into 
urban land. Active land policy therefore constitutes an incentive for 
urban expansion. Still, Buitelaar and Leinfelder (2020) add that devel-
oping greenfields in the Netherlands is often costly due to the country’s 
weak soil. They remark that active land policy “provides an incentive for 
consolidated sprawl” (p. 52). 
Still, the use of land exploitation as an instrument has declined. 
Smaller municipalities in particular rarely own land that is suitable for 
development (Treasurer, Municipality G, Utrecht). Additionally, the 
financial crisis of 2007–2008 illustrated the high risks connected with 
active land development. Municipalities buy and develop land, but in 
times of economic decline, it is not certain whether private actors are 
willing to purchase it (van Oosten et al., 2018). 
3.4. Reconsidering fiscal incentives 
While it is possible to assume that both Dutch and German munici-
palities are rewarded for growth in general, it is difficult to prove which 
land use is the most profitable. One can expect that municipal officials in 
charge of spatial planning do not know all these details either. This 
became clear from the interviews we conducted. Nevertheless, it is 
possible that land policies are – to some degree – based on false expec-
tations of profitability. 
4. The policy goals of interviewed municipalities 
We conducted interviews with planning practitioners on different 
levels of government to gain a better understanding of how fiscal in-
centives are perceived in practice. On the municipal level, most in-
terviewees did not see strong relations between land policy goals and 
fiscal incentives. They recognized that their municipality has to generate 
revenues to cover its expenditures and also that sufficient revenues 
represent a precondition to achieving politically defined development 
goals. But the latter, politically defined goals were considered as much 
stronger in shaping land policies than fiscal incentives. While inter-
viewed mayors and treasurers could point out developments that were 
especially profitable, planners were often not able to say how a certain 
project would affect the municipal budget. Although the German and the 
Dutch fiscal system are very different, interviewees in both case areas 
mentioned comparable land policy goals:  
- Stabilize housing prices: Demand for housing is high in the popular 
suburbs of Berlin and in some municipalities near the city of Utrecht. 
In order to stabilize housing prices, municipalities in Brandenburg 
have tried to apply a rent cap. However, after evaluating the effec-
tiveness of this instrument, they realized that housing prices cannot 
be controlled unless the supply follows the demand (Project man-
ager, Brandenburg Ministry of the Interior). Around Utrecht too, 
growth is seen as a necessity to keep housing prices at an affordable 
level (Planner, municipality E, Utrecht).  
- Ensure a balanced population: Another reason to grow is the political 
goal to create space for a more diverse population in the suburban 
areas near Berlin that are mostly characterized by single-family 
homes. Often, the grown-up children of the families that moved to 
these areas decades ago cannot afford a house at the beginning of 
their career and are forced to move away (Mayor, municipality C, 
Brandenburg). Additionally, municipalities with a high concentra-
tion of low-paying jobs (e.g., freight centre Grossbeeren and airport 
area Schönefeld) are interested in providing their workers with 
affordable housing opportunities (Mayor, municipality C, Branden-
burg). The political focus on this issue also reflects the representation 
of certain political parties in the city council (Planner, municipality 
B, Brandenburg). In the province of Utrecht, rural municipalities 
with few job opportunities are expecting their population to age 
drastically in the coming years. They see growth as an opportunity to 
attract and keep young families in the municipality, which is a ne-
cessity for stabilizing the population and ensuring that schools, 
Table 2 
Revenues and expenditures of German municipalities.  
National 
grant 
The extent of the unconditional grant depends on the size of the 
national grant pool as well as on the anticipated financial needs of 
the municipality. This financial need is calculated based on factors 
like population, built-up area, amount of young and elderly 
residents, but also local tax revenues, etc. Depending on their size, 
municipalities belong to a certain grant category. They move to a 
higher category as they grow. 
Tax revenues The most important municipal tax is the property tax that must be 
paid by the owners of business and residential real estate. It is 
calculated based on the value of the buildings and the value of the 
plot of land that the building is located on. Just as in Germany, the 
municipality can define its own collection rate. Generally, 
businesses generate more property tax revenues than residential use 
(Treasurer, municipality G, Utrecht). 
Other 
revenues 
Other sources of revenues are land exploitation and long-time land 
leases. In the Netherlands, many municipalities pursue an active 
land policy. This means that the municipality buys land, changes the 
zoning plan, prepares the land for development and sells it ( 
Tennekes, 2018). The planning gain then stays in the municipal 
budget and can be spent on public services and infrastructure ( 
Buitelaar, 2010). 
Expenditures The largest expenditures for Dutch municipalities are staff 
expenditures and social costs (CBS, 2020). Especially the social costs 
are rising with an increasing number of tasks being transferred to the 
municipal level from higher levels of government. Within this 
category, the expenses for unemployment benefits and allowances 
for nursing care are the highest (BDO, 2020).To some degree, these 
social costs can be influenced by the chosen land policy of the 
municipality. When developing new residential areas, a 
municipality can avoid targeting elderly citizens, unemployed or 
citizens with a low income.  
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retail, sports clubs, etc. can function (Planner, municipality F, 
Utrecht).  
- Avoid high consequential costs and congestion: The municipalities 
around Berlin have experienced a rapid, and mostly unregulated, 
growth in the past decades. Many municipalities have missed the 
opportunity to reserve areas and money for schools and kindergar-
tens and have not sufficiently adapted their transport infrastructure 
(Planner, Joint planning Department Berlin-Brandenburg). After 
decades of shrinkage, they anticipated neither the sudden growth nor 
its high consequential costs (Mayor, municipality C, Brandenburg). 
Nowadays, many municipalities near Berlin report crowded schools 
and congested roads (Planner, Joint planning Department Berlin- 
Brandenburg). They are therefore hesitant to allow more growth as 
the increase in tax revenue does not cover the consequential costs of 
having to adapt the infrastructure (Planner, municipality D, Bran-
denburg). This is reflected in the political debate. Inhabitants and 
local politicians grow increasingly dissatisfied with insufficient 
infrastructure developments. They oppose further growth, as it 
would worsen, for example, the congestion of local streets.  
- Preserve natural assets: Residents near Berlin actively block further 
developments to preserve the nature that enticed them back when 
they once moved there (Mayor, municipality A, Brandenburg). Also 
interviewed municipalities in the Province of Utrecht experience 
further urbanization as a danger to one of the province’s greatest 
assets: open, natural landscapes (Planner, municipality E, Utrecht). 
In the eyes of the interviewees, money plays a subordinate role in 
their municipality’s land policy goals. Still, they were often able to name 
other municipalities whose interest in increasing revenues they 
perceived as a more crucial factor for land policy. In fact, the degree to 
which profitability determines the land policy of a municipality seems to 
differ from municipality to municipality, even within the same fiscal 
system. 
How can these differences be explained? Why do fiscal incentives 
and the desire to generate local revenues influence the land policies of 
municipalities within the same fiscal system differently? How can it be 
that the same municipalities that pursued expansive spatial policies in 
the 1990s are no longer interested in growth? Which factors influence 
the weighting of different interests in municipal land policies? 
5. Discussion 
We have now analysed influences on municipal land policies both in 
a vertical and a horizontal dimension. At first, a comparison of revenues 
of Dutch and German municipalities suggested strong incentives for 
their land policies, as was already anticipated by Kaufmann (2018a). But 
when also taking into account the (indirect) costs that follow urban 
development, as well as the effect of increasing revenues on the extent of 
supralocal grants, it becomes more difficult to point out which policies 
are more profitable to a municipality than others. Still, it is possible that 
profit-seeking municipalities are seduced by a quick boost in revenues 
without always taking into account the costs that will follow upon urban 
expansion in the long term. History has shown this lack of foresight. 
When allocating large new residential and business areas in the 1990s, 
municipalities around Berlin did not anticipate the high costs for 
infrastructure investments that would be needed once the buildings 
were occupied. 
The challenge of anticipating consequential costs still exists today. Of 
course, both Dutch and German municipalities make budget plans. But 
while the profitability of a single construction site can be calculated 
more or less precisely, it can be difficult to predict the fiscal viability of a 
newly allocated building zone. As the example of the municipalities 
around Berlin has showed, this effect compounds if a long time passes 
between a building zone’s allocation and its residential use. It is ques-
tionable whether a municipality can even predict the exact usage and 
therefore future costs of a residential zone. Several German states offer 
calculation tools to give planners an overview of infrastructure in-
vestments that a new building zone will cause. But the costs of a new 
school or kindergarten are often not taken into account when deciding 
upon the profitability of a development project. 
Also, when assessing the influence of fiscal incentives on municipal 
land policies, one would expect municipalities with a weak fiscal posi-
tion to act more in accordance with fiscal incentives than municipalities 
with a strong fiscal position. Although more research is required, the 
interviews did not indicate any such relationship. Interviewed planners 
and municipal representatives doubted that the fiscal position of a 
municipality determines its inclination to follow fiscal incentives. They 
often referred to the municipality of Schönefeld – one of the richest 
municipalities in Brandenburg – that is widely known for its expansive 
development. 
In the perspective of interviewed planners, local pressures weighed 
much heavier than fiscal incentives on the vertical dimension. On the 
one hand, this local dimension covers local business actors, such as 
developers, who negotiate land use plans with municipal governments. 
In these negotiations, municipalities can have a strong position if the 
demand for housing is high, which makes investments in housing pro-
jects profitable and safe. Larger municipalities that own public housing 
societies can even avoid negotiations with private developers. In smaller 
municipalities, on the other hand, planners admit that profitability plays 
a larger role in planning (Planner, municipality D, Brandenburg). Next 
to local business actors, citizens were also said to have a strong influence 
on land policy formulation. Municipalities around Berlin have experi-
enced rapid growth in the past decades. As a consequence, transport 
infrastructure is lagging behind, schools are too small and residents have 
problems finding kindergarten spots. Further growth would worsen the 
situation and additionally decrease the natural values of the areas. The 
relatively wealthy inhabitants therefore actively engage in local politics 
and block further developments (Mayor, municipality A, Brandenburg). 
Also, Monstadt and Meilinger (2020) observe that municipalities with 
high income tax revenues oppose further urban development. Citizens 
are not only critical towards urban expansion but also dense inner-city 
developments, although these would comply with national goals to 
prevent further land take. In some municipalities, dense forms of living 
have a negative connotation. It is argued that multi-story dwellings will 
attract low-income, or even unemployed, residents who will disturb the 
social coherence in the municipality. This form of framing can hinder 
the emergence of space-saving spatial policies. 
As described in Kübler and Pagano (2012), also the nesting of a 
municipality within the metropolitan region has an impact on land 
policy formulation. This could be observed in Utrecht, where munici-
palities followed the lead of a single municipality that was fast at 
attracting young residents after detecting an ageing population trend 
(Planner, municipality F, Utrecht). 
As concluded by Kaufmann (2018a), local arrangements have a 
strong influence on municipal land policies. Although they function 
within different fiscal systems, municipalities around Berlin and Utrecht 
face comparable local pressures that ultimately shape their land policies. 
Understanding incentives on both the vertical dimension and the hori-
zontal dimension allows for a more holistic understanding of the way 
that municipalities develop spatial policies and thus a better answer to 
the question of why municipalities pursue growth-oriented land policies. 
6. Conclusion 
The aim of this research was to obtain a more differentiated under-
standing of the effect of fiscal incentives on local land policies and 
thereby to contribute to knowledge on causes of land take. The main 
research question of this study was, “How do different fiscal systems affect 
the land policy goals of local governments?”. 
To answer the research question, we performed qualitative analyses 
in two metropolitan areas in Germany and the Netherlands: two coun-
tries with contrasting fiscal systems. Secondary research resulted in an 
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understanding of the functioning of the two distinct fiscal systems, as 
well as the forms of land use that are especially profitable for a mu-
nicipality. Semi-structured interviews with municipal representatives 
complemented this understanding of fiscal incentives together with the 
role they play in the development of municipal land policies. 
At first sight, Germany and the Netherlands seem to be representa-
tive examples of respectively a decentralised and a centralised fiscal 
system. German municipalities collect local business and income taxes, 
which incentivize the development of business- and high-end residential 
areas. Dutch municipalities depend on national grants, seemingly 
rewarding growth-oriented behaviour to a lesser degree. But, having 
thoroughly analysed municipal revenues and expenditures, the differ-
ences between the two systems become more blurred. Growing Dutch 
municipalities benefit from larger allocations from the rate support 
grant, a higher degree of efficiency gained from infrastructure in-
vestments and can additionally profit from land exploitation. In Ger-
many, on the other hand, profits from urban expansion have to be 
compared to increasing contribution costs to neighbouring municipal-
ities, reductions of the state rate support grant and consequential in-
vestments in infrastructure. In planning literature, this aspect of 
balancing mechanisms in fiscal systems and (long-term) reactions of 
municipal budgets to growth are rarely taken into consideration when 
analysing effects of fiscal incentives on land policies. The latter is not 
only a blind spot in planning literature, but also in planning practice. 
When developers plan a building project, they calculate the balance 
between building costs and profits from selling the completed units in 
finest detail. But when municipalities allocate new residential zones, 
many may not consider investments in, for example, social infrastruc-
ture that will be necessary in the future. This is especially so because a 
long time can pass between the allocation and the actual development of 
a residential area. 
In the eyes of interviewed planners, fiscal incentives have little effect 
on their municipality’s respective land policies. And although some 
municipalities strategically grow to increase their tax base, most in-
terviewees underlined that other, local pressures shaped their land 
policy goals to a much larger degree. On the one hand, pressure on the 
housing market or an ageing population ask for further construction. On 
the other hand, local residents block new developments to preserve 
natural assets, social cohesion and prevent congestion. 
This suggests that, in order to limit land take, one should not solely 
focus on fiscal incentives. Market-based solutions, such as fiscal coun-
terincentives or instruments such as tradable development rights can 
support urban developments that are more desirable from a regional 
perspective, like brownfield redevelopments and dense residential 
areas. But they will not put an end to urban sprawl. To prevent land take, 
instruments must also address issues of demographic change, growing 
housing prices or the decreasing support of infrastructure services in 
shrinking areas. 
In our paper, we were asking what influence fiscal incentives have on 
municipal land policies. We expected that the contrasting fiscal systems 
would be clearly recognizable in the land policy goals of interviewed 
municipalities. In fact, interviewed planners had little insight into the 
fiscal consequences of their municipalities’ respective development 
plans. Mayors and municipal treasurers could say more about the 
connection between their development strategies and the municipal 
budget. In future research, it will be fruitful to have more interviews 
with the latter group, as this will shed more light on which land policies 
municipalities can pursue to expand their budget or deal with long-term 
debt or profit. In combination with quantitative research, this might give 
a generalizable picture of correlations between fiscal incentives and 
urban development. In addition, this study points at the need to explore 
the relation between municipal land policy and fiscal incentives on a 
broader level – i.e., a national or state planning level. This can give a 
more general perspective on the role that fiscal issues (should) play in 
planning education and practice. 
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Tekorten lopen op, meer gemeenten in ’t rood. (Accessed 24 November 2020) htt 
ps://herbertraat.files.wordpress.com/2020/04/bdo-benchmark-nederlandse-ge 
meenten-2020.pdf. 
Bertelsmann Stiftung. (2019). Kommunaler Finanzreport 2019. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann 
Stiftung. Retrieved May 6, 2021, from https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fil 
eadmin/files/Projekte/Kommunale_Finanzen/Finanzreport-2019-gesamt.pdf. 
Buitelaar, E., 2010. Window on the Netherlands: cracks in the myth: challenges to land 
policy in the Netherlands. Tijdschr. voor Econ. En. Soc. Geogr. 101, 349–356. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9663.2010.00604.x. 
Buitelaar, E., Leinfelder, H., 2020. Public design of urban sprawl: governments and the 
extension of the urban fabric in Flanders and the Netherlands. Urban Plan. 5 (1), 
46–57. https://doi.org/10.17645/up.v5i1.2669. 
CBS (2020). StatLine, the electronic databank of Statistics Netherlands. (Accessed 27 
June 2021) http://statline.cbs.nl/Statweb. 
Christoffersen, H., 2019. The municipality first. Byplan nyt 16. 
Colombo, F., van Schaick, J., & Witsen, P.P. (2018). Kracht van Regionaal Ontwerp: 25 
jaar vormgeven aan Zuid-Holland. De Nieuwe Haagsche. 
Colsaet, A., Laurans, Y., Levrel, H., 2018. What drives land take and urban land 
expansion? A systematic review. Land Use Policy 79, 339–349. https://doi.org/ 
10.1016/j.landusepol.2018.08.017. 
Debrunner, G., Hartmann, T., 2020. Strategic use of land policy instruments for 
affordable housing: Coping with social challenges under scarce land conditions in 
Swiss cities. Land Use Policy 99, 104993. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. 
landusepol.2020.104993. 
Die Bundesregierung, 2018. Deutsche Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie: Aktualisierung 2018. 
Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung,, Berlin. https://www.bundesre 
gierung.de/resource/blob/975292/1559082/a9795692a667605f652981aa9b6ca 
b51/deutsche-nachhaltigkeitsstrategie-aktualisierung-2018-download-bpa-data.pdf.  
Duranton, G., Puga, D., 2013. The growth of cities. Organisation for Economic Co- 
operation and Development. https://www.oecd.org/economy/growth/Growth_of_ 
cities_Duranton.pdf. 
European Commission. (2011). Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe. Brussels. 
European Commission, 2012. Guidelines on Best Practice to Limit, Mitigate or 
Compensate Soil Sealing. European Commission, Brussels (Accessed 24 November 
2020). https://ec.europa.eu/environment/soil/pdf/guidelines/pub/soil_en.pdf.  
Fertner, C., Jørgensen, G., Nielsen, T.S., Nilsson, K., 2016. Urban Sprawl and growth 
management – drivers, impacts and responses in selected European and US cities. 
Future Cities Environ. 2 (9) https://doi.org/10.1186/s40984-016-0022-2. 
Gerber, J.-D., Hartmann, T., Hengstermann, A., 2018b. Preface (pp. xi-xii). In: Gerber, J.- 
D., Hartmann, T., Hengstermann, A. (Eds.), Instruments of Land Policy: Dealing with 
Scarcity of Land. Routledge. 
Gesellschaft für Innovationsforschung und Beratung mbH & Deutsches Institut für 
Urbanistik gGmbH, 2012. Regionalwirtschaftliches Gutachten zu den Auswirkungen 
des Flughafens Berlin Brandenburg auf die Entwicklung der Kommunen im 
Flughafenumfeld (RG FU BER). Deutsches Institut fuer Urbanistik,. https://difu.de 
/publikationen/2012/regionalwirtschaftliches-gutachten-zu-den-auswirkungen-de 
s-flughafens-berlin-brandenburg-auf-die. 
Goldsmith, M., 1995. Autonomy and City Limits. In: Judge, D., Stoker, G., Wolman, H. 
(Eds.), Theories of Urban Politics. SAGE, pp. 228–252. 
Hall, P.A., Taylor, R.C., 1996. Political sciences and the three new institutionalisms. 
Political Stud. 44 (5), 936–957. 
Hartmann, T., Spit, T., 2015. Dilemmas of involvement in land management – Comparing 
an active (Dutch) and a passive (German) approach. Land Use Policy 42, 729–737. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2014.10.004. 
V. Götze and T. Hartmann                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Land Use Policy 109 (2021) 105681
7
Hartoft-Nielsen, P., 2018. Kampen om stationsnærhedspolitikken: Bedre målopfyldelse 
med forenkling af Fingerplanens regler. Aalborg Universitetsforlag. 
Henger, R., Bizer, K., 2010. Tradable planning permits for land-use control in Germany. 
Land Use Policy 27 (3), 843–852. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. 
landusepol.2009.11.003. 
Hooghe, L., Marks, G., 2003. Unraveling the Central State, but how? Types of multilevel 
governance. Am. Political Sci. Rev. 97 (2), 233–243. 
Horak, M., Young, R., 2012. Sites of governance: multilevel governance and policy 
making in Canada’s big cities. McGill-Queen’s University Press. 
Kaufmann, D., Sager, F., 2018. How to organize secondary capital city regions: 
institutional drivers of locational policy coordination. Governance 32 (1), 63–81. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12346. 
Kaufmann, D., 2018a. Capital cities in interurban competition: local autonomy, urban 
governance and locational policy making. Urban Aff. Rev. 1–38. https://doi.org/ 
10.1177/1078087418809939. 
Kaufmann, D., 2018b. Varieties of capital cities: The competitiveness challenge for 
secondary capitals. Edward Elgar Publishing,. 
Kaufmann, D., Arnold, T., 2017. Strategies of cities in globalised interurban competition: 
the locational policies framework. Urban Stud. 55 (12), 2703–2720. https://doi.org/ 
10.1177/0042098017707922. 
Kaufmann, D., Sidney, M., 2020. Toward an urban policy analysis: incorporating 
participation, multilevel governance, and “seeing like a city”. Political Sci. Polit. 53 
(1), 1–5. 
Knoepfel, P., Larrue, C., Varone, F., Hill, M., 2007. Public Policy Analysis. The Policy 
Press. 
Kübler, D., Pagano, M.A., 2012. Urban politics as multilevel analysis. In: Mossberger, K., 
Clarke, S.E., John, P. (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Urban Politics. Oxford 
University Press, pp. 114–129. 
Langer, S., Korzhenevych, A., 2018. The effect of industrial and commercial land 
consumption on municipal tax revenue: evidence from Bavaria. Land Use Policy 77, 
279–287. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2018.05.052. 
Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2019. Ontwerp Nationale 
Omgevingsvisie: Duurzaam perspectief voor onze leefomgeving. Ministerie van 
Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, Den Haag. Retrieved November 24, 
2020, from. https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documente 
n/rapporten/2019/06/06/ontwerp-nationale-omgevingsvisie/ontwerp-nationale 
-omgevingsvisie.pdf.  
Monstadt, J., Meilinger, V., 2020. Governing Suburbia through regionalized land-use 
planning? Experiences from the Greater Frankfurt region. Land Use Policy 91, 1–12. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2019.104300. 
North, D., 1990. Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. 
Cambridge University Press,. 
OECD, 2017. The Governance of Land Use in OECD Countries: Policy analysis and 
recommendations. OECD Publishing,, Paris. Retrieved November 24, 2020, from. 
https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/urban-rural-and-regional-development/the-governan 
ce-of-land-use-in-oecd-countries_9789264268609-en.  
Scharpf, F.W., 1997. Games real actors play: actor-centered institutionalism in policy 
research. Westview Press,. 
Scherf, W., 2010. Die kommunalen Finanzen in Deutschland. In: Kost, A., Wehling, H.-G. 
(Eds.), Kommunalpolitik in den deutschen Ländern. Springer. 
Shao, Z., Bakker, M., Spit, T., Janssen-Jansen, L., Qun, W., 2020. Containing urban 
expansion in China: the case of Nanjing. J. Environ. Plan. Manag. 63 (2), 189–209. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09640568.2019.1576511. 
Tennekes, J., 2018. Negotiated land use plans in the Netherlands: A central instrument in 
Dutch ‘active’ and ‘passive’ land policy. In: Gerber, J.-D., Hartmann, T., 
Hengstermann, A. (Eds.), Instruments of Land Policy: Dealing with Scarcity of Land. 
Routledge, pp. 101–113. 
van Oosten, T., Witte, P., Hartmann, T., 2018. Active land policy in small municipalities 
in the Netherlands: “We don’t do it, unless…”. Land Use Policy 77, 829–836. https:// 
doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2017.10.029. 
van Zoest, J., 2010. Metropolitan landscapes as a test case for regional planning. In: 
Meijsmans, N. (Ed.), Designing for a Region. Sun Academia, pp. 105–114. 
Wegener, M., 2016. Government or governance? The challenge of planning for 
sustainability in the Ruhr. In: Hartmann, T., Needham, B. (Eds.), Planning By Law 
and Property Rights Reconsidered. Routledge, pp. 157–170. 
European Environment Agency (EEA), 2019. Land take in Europe. Indicator Assessment. 
(Accessed 7 May 2021) https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/land 
-take-3/assessment. 
V. Götze and T. Hartmann                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
